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Intregul document in engleza:

Scenarios for the Future of Technology
and International Development
This report was produced by
The Rockefeller Foundation
and Global Business Network.
May 2010
Letter from Judith Rodin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Letter from Peter Schwartz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
WHY SCENARIOS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
WHY TECHNOLOGY?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
THE FOCAL QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
ENGAGING YOUR IMAGINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Scenario Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHOOSING THE CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
GLOBAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ALIGNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
THE SCENARIO NARRATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Lock Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Clever Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Hack Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Smart Scramble. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Concluding Thoughts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Rockefeller Foundation supports work that expands opportunity and strengthens
resilience to social, economic, health, and environmental challenges—affirming
its pioneering philanthropic mission, since 1913, to “promote the well-being” of
humanity. We take a synergistic, strategic approach that places a high value on
innovative processes and encourages new ways of seeking ideas, to break down silos
and encourage interdisciplinary thinking.
One important—and novel—component of our strategy toolkit is scenario planning,
a process of creating narratives about the future based on factors likely to affect a
particular set of challenges and opportunities. We believe that scenario planning has
great potential for use in philanthropy to identify unique interventions, simulate and
rehearse important decisions that could have profound implications, and highlight
previously undiscovered areas of connection and intersection. Most important,
by providing a methodological structure that helps us focus on what we don’t
know—instead of what we already know—scenario planning allows us to achieve
impact more effectively.
The results of our first scenario planning exercise demonstrate a provocative and
engaging exploration of the role of technology and the future of globalization,
as you will see in the following pages. This report is crucial reading for anyone
interested in creatively considering the multiple, divergent ways in which our world
could evolve. The sparks of insight inspiring these narratives—along with their
implications for philanthropy as a whole—were generated through the invaluable
collaboration of grantee representatives, external experts, and Rockefeller
Foundation staff. I offer a special thanks to Peter Schwartz, Andrew Blau, and the
entire team at Global Business Network, who have helped guide us through this
stimulating and energizing process.
Letter from Judith Rodin
President of the Rockefeller Foundation
4Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Leading this effort at the Rockefeller Foundation is our Research Unit, which
analyzes emerging risks and opportunities and thinks imaginatively about how to
respond to the complex, rapidly changing world around us. This outward-looking
intelligence function adopts a cross-cutting mindset that synthesizes and integrates
knowledge that accelerates our ability to act more quickly and effectively. It has
also helped to shape and build the notion of “pro-poor foresight” that is committed
to applying forward-looking tools and techniques to improve the lives of poor and
vulnerable populations around the world.
I hope this publication makes clear exactly why my colleagues and I are so excited
about the promise of using scenario planning to develop robust strategies and offer a
refreshing viewpoint on the possibilities that lie ahead. We welcome your feedback.
Judith Rodin
The Rockefeller Foundation
5Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
We are at a moment in history that is full of opportunity. Technology is poised to
transform the lives of millions of people throughout the world, especially those who
have had little or no access to the tools that can deliver sustainable improvements
for their families and communities. From farmers using mobile phones to buy and
sell crops to doctors remotely monitoring and treating influenza outbreaks in rural
villages, technology is rapidly becoming more and more integral to the pace and
progress of development.
Philanthropy has a unique and critical role to play in this process. By focusing its
patience, capital, and attention on the links between technology and international
development, philanthropy will change not just lives but the very context in
which the field of philanthropy operates. This report represents an initial step in
that direction. It explores four very different—yet very possible—scenarios for
the future of technology and development in order to illuminate the challenges
and opportunities that may lie ahead. It promotes a deeper understanding of the
complex forces and dynamics that will accelerate or inhibit the use of technology
to spur growth, opportunity, and resilience especially in the developing world.
Finally, it will seed a new strategic conversation among the key public, private, and
philanthropic stakeholders about technology and development at the policy, program,
and human levels.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s use of scenario planning to explore technology and
international development has been both inspired and ambitious. Throughout my
40-plus-year career as a scenario planner, I have worked with many of the world’s
leading companies, governments, foundations, and nonprofits—and I know firsthand
the power of the approach. Scenario planning is a powerful tool precisely because
the future is unpredictable and shaped by many interacting variables. Scenarios
enable us to think creatively and rigorously about the different ways these forces
may interact, while forcing us to challenge our own assumptions about what we
Letter from Peter Schwartz
Cofounder and Chairman of Global Business Network
6Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
believe or hope the future will be. Scenarios embrace and weave together multiple
perspectives and provide an ongoing framework for spotting and making sense of
important changes as they emerge. Perhaps most importantly, scenarios give us a
new, shared language that deepens our conversations about the future and how we
can help to shape it.
The Rockefeller Foundation has already used this project as an opportunity to
clarify and advance the relationship between technology and development.
Through interviews and the scenario workshops, they have engaged a diverse set
of people—from different geographies, disciplines, and sectors—to identify the key
forces driving change, to explore the most critical uncertainties, and to develop
challenging yet plausible scenarios and implications. They have stretched their
thinking far beyond theoretical models of technology innovation and diffusion in
order to imagine how technology could actually change the lives of people from
many walks of life. This is only the start of an important conversation that will
continue to shape the potential of technology and international development going
forward. I look forward to staying a part of that conversation and to the better future
it will bring.
Peter Schwartz
Cofounder and Chairman
Global Business Network
7Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
For decades, technology has been dramatically changing
not just the lives of individuals in developed countries, but
increasingly the lives and livelihoods of people throughout
the developing world. Whether it is a community mobile
phone, a solar panel, a new farming practice, or a cuttingedge medical device, technology is altering the landscape of
possibility in places where possibilities used to be scarce.
And yet looking out to the future, there is no
single story to be told about how technology
will continue to help shape—or even
revolutionize—life in developing countries. There
are many possibilities, some good and some less
so, some known and some unknowable. Indeed,
for everything we think we can anticipate about
how technology and international development
will interact and intertwine in the next 20 years
and beyond, there is so much more that we
cannot yet even imagine.
For philanthropies as well as for other
organizations, this presents a unique challenge:
given the uncertainty about how the future will
play out, how can we best position ourselves not
just to identify technologies that improve the
lives of poor communities but also to help scale
and spread those that emerge? And how will the
social, technological, economic, environmental,
and political conditions of the future enable or
inhibit our ability to do so?
The Rockefeller Foundation believes that
in order to understand the many ways in
which technology will impact international
development in the future, we must first broaden
and deepen our individual and collective
understanding of the range of possibilities. This
report, and the project upon which it is based,
is one attempt to do that. In it, we share the
outputs and insights from a year-long project,
undertaken by the Rockefeller Foundation and
Global Business Network (GBN), designed to
8Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
explore the role of technology in international
development through scenario planning, a
methodology in which GBN is a long-time leader.
This report builds on the Rockefeller
Foundation’s growing body of work in the
emerging field of pro-poor foresight. In 2009,
the Institute for Alternative Futures published
the report Foresight for Smart Globalization:
Accelerating and Enhancing Pro-Poor
Development Opportunities, with support from
the Rockefeller Foundation. That effort was a
reflection of the Foundation’s strong commitment
to exploring innovative processes and embracing
new pathways for insight aimed at helping the
world’s poor. With this report, the Foundation
takes a further step in advancing the field of
pro-poor foresight, this time through the lens of
scenario planning.
The goal of this project was not to affirm what
is already known and knowable about what
is happening right now at the intersections of
technology and development. Rather, it was to
explore the many ways in which technology
and development could co-evolve—could both
push and inhibit each other—in the future, and
then to begin to examine what those possible
alternative paths may imply for the world’s
poor and vulnerable populations. Such an
exercise required project participants to push
their thinking far beyond the status quo, into
uncharted territory.
Scenario planning is a methodology designed
to help guide groups and individuals through
exactly this creative process. The process
begins by identifying forces of change in the
world, then combining those forces in different
ways to create a set of diverse stories—or
scenarios—about how the future could evolve.
Scenarios are designed to stretch our thinking
about both the opportunities and obstacles that
the future might hold; they explore, through
narrative, events and dynamics that might
alter, inhibit, or enhance current trends, often
in surprising ways. Together, a set of scenarios
captures a range of future possibilities,
good and bad, expected and surprising—but
always plausible. Importantly, scenarios are
not predictions. Rather, they are thoughtful
hypotheses that allow us to imagine, and then to
rehearse, different strategies for how to be more
prepared for the future—or more ambitiously,
how to help shape better
futures ourselves.
9Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Technology was chosen as a focal point of this
project because of its potentially transformative
role—both in a positive and negative way—in
addressing a wide range of development
challenges, from climate change, healthcare,
and agriculture to housing, transportation, and
education. Yet while there is little doubt that
technology will continue to be a driver of change
across the developing world in the future, the
precise trajectory along which technological
innovation will travel is highly uncertain.
For example, will critical technological
advances come from the developed world, or
will innovators and their innovations be more
geographically dispersed? Or, how might the
global economic and political environment affect
the pace of technology development?
It is important to state that in focusing on
technology, this project did not set out to
identify a set of exact, yet-to-be-invented
technologies that will help shape and change the
future. Rather, the goal was to gain a broader
and richer understanding of different paths
along which technology could develop—paths
that will be strongly influenced by the overall
global environment in which the inventors
and adopters of those technologies will find
themselves working and dwelling. Technology,
as a category, cannot be divorced from the
context in which it develops. The scenarios
shared in this report explore four such contexts,
each of which, as you’ll see, suggests very
different landscapes for technology and its
potential impacts in the developing world.
Finally, a note about what we mean by
“technology.” In this report, we use the term to
refer to a broad spectrum of tools and methods of
organization. Technologies can range from tools
for basic survival, such as a treadle pump and
basic filtration technologies, to more advanced
innovations, such as methods of collecting
and utilizing data in health informatics
and novel building materials with real-time
environmental sensing capabilities. This
report focuses on themes associated with the
widespread scalability, adoption, and assessment
of technology in the developing world. While
the scenarios themselves are narratives about
the global environment, we have paid particular
attention to how events might transpire in subSaharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and India.
10Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Every scenario project has a focal question—
a broad yet strategic query that serves as an
anchor for the scenarios. For this project, the
focal question was:
How might technology affect barriers to
building resilience and equitable growth
in the developing world over the next
15 to 20 years?
In other words, what new or existing
technologies could be leveraged to improve
the capacity of individuals, communities,
and systems to respond to major changes, or
what technologies could improve the lives of
vulnerable populations around the world? A
15- to 20-year timeframe was chosen on the
assumption that it is both sufficiently long
enough that significant technological change
is plausible and sufficiently short enough that
we can imagine some possibilities for the kinds
of technologies that could be developed and
applied. Focusing on how to overcome a set
of obstacles associated with the application of
technology to the challenges of development
helped to both bound the inquiry and promote a
problem-solving approach that seeks to identify
potential, systematic intervention opportunities.
It is our hope that these scenarios help inspire
the same future-orientation in other initiatives
that are broadly concerned with technology and
international development. Of course, there is no
hard data about the future—nobody yet knows
precisely what technologies will be successful at
addressing new and evolving development needs.
Rather, as you read the scenarios, think of them
as a journey—four journeys—into a future that
is relevant, thought-provoking, and possible.
Imagine how the world will function and how
it will be organized to tackle the challenges it
faces. Who will be responsible for driving local
and global development initiatives and what
would that require? And what is your own role
in leading your organization, community, or
region to a preferred future?
A Note on Terminology
The Foundation’s work promotes “resilience
and equitable growth.” Resilience refers to
the capacity of individuals, communities,
and systems to survive, adapt, and grow
in the face of changes, even catastrophic
incidents. Equitable growth involves enabling
individuals, communities, and institutions
to access new tools, practices, resources,
services, and products.
11Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenarios are a medium through which great
change can be not just envisioned but also
actualized. The more closely you read them, the
more likely it becomes that you will recognize
their important but less obvious implications
to you, your work, and your community. We
strongly encourage you to share and discuss
this report widely, use it as a springboard for
further creative thinking about how technology
could shape development, and test and adjust
your strategies or personal actions accordingly.
It is also our hope that these scenarios help
to identify potential areas of future work for
governments, philanthropies, corporations, and
nonprofits, and that they illuminate choices and
commitments that a wide range of organizations
may want to make in these areas in the future.
This report adds to a growing body of literature focusing on the relationship between
technology, development, and social systems. While not a comprehensive list, the following
readings offer additional insights on this topic.
• Caroline Wagner, The New Invisible College: Science for Development, 2008.
• Institute for the Future, Science and Technology Outlook: 2005-2055, 2006.
• RAND Corporation, The Global Technology Revolution 2020, In-Depth Analyses,
• World Bank, Science, Technology, and Innovation: Capacity Building for Sustainable
Growth and Poverty Reduction, 2008.
• UN Millennium Project, Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation,
Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development, 2006.
• W. Brian Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves, 2009.
• STEPS Centre Working Papers, Innovation, Sustainability, Development: A New
Manifesto, 2009.
12Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
The Rockefeller Foundation and GBN began the scenario
process by surfacing a host of driving forces that
would affect the future of technology and international
development. These forces were generated through both
secondary research and in-depth interviews with Foundation
staff, Foundation grantees, and external experts.
Next, all these constituents came together
in several exploratory workshops to further
brainstorm the content of these forces,
which could be divided into two categories:
predetermined elements and critical
uncertainties. A good starting point for any
set of scenarios is to understand those driving
forces that we can be reasonably certain will
shape the worlds we are describing, also known
as “predetermined elements.” For example, it is
a near geopolitical certainty that—with the rise
of China, India, and other nations—a multi-polar
global system is emerging. One demographic
certainty is that global population growth
will continue and will put pressure on energy,
food, and water resources—especially in the
developing world. Another related certainty: that
the world will strive to source more of its energy
from renewable resources and may succeed, but
there will likely still be a significant level of
global interdependence on energy.
Predetermined elements are important to
any scenario story, but they are not the
foundation on which these stories are built.
Rather, scenarios are formed around “critical
uncertainties”—driving forces that are
considered both highly important to the focal
issue and highly uncertain in terms of their
future resolution. Whereas predetermined
elements are predictable driving forces,
uncertainties are by their nature unpredictable:
their outcome can be guessed at but not known.
The Scenario
13Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
While any single uncertainty could challenge
our thinking, the future will be shaped by
multiple forces playing out over time. The
scenario framework provides a structured way to
consider how these critical uncertainties might
unfold and evolve in combination. Identifying
the two most important uncertainties guarantees
that the resulting scenarios will differ in ways
that have been judged to be critical to the
focal question.
During this project’s scenario creation workshop,
participants—who represented a range of
regional and international perspectives—selected
the two critical uncertainties that would form
the basis of the scenario framework. They
chose these two uncertainties from a longer
list of potential uncertainties that might
shape the broader contextual environment of
the scenarios, including social, technology,
economic, environmental, and political trends.
The uncertainties that were considered included,
for example, the pervasiveness of conflict
in the developing world; the frequency and
severity of shocks like economic and political
crises, disease, and natural disasters; and the
locus of innovation for crucial technologies
for development. (A full list of the critical
uncertainties identified during the project, as
well as a list of project participants, can be
found in the Appendix.)
The two chosen uncertainties, introduced
below, together define a set of four scenarios
for the future of technology and international
development that are divergent, challenging,
internally consistent, and plausible. Each of the
two uncertainties is expressed as an axis that
represents a continuum of possibilities ranging
between two endpoints.
14Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
This uncertainty refers to both the amount
of economic integration—the flow of goods,
capital, people, and ideas—as well as the
extent to which enduring and effective
political structures enable the world to deal
with many of the global challenges it faces.
On one end of the axis, we would see a more
integrated global economy with high trade
volumes, which enables access to a wider range
of goods and services through imports and
exports, and the increasing specialization of
exports. We would also see more cooperation
at the supra-national level, fostering increased
collaboration, strengthened global institutions,
and the formation of effective international
problem-solving networks. At the other
axis endpoint, the potential for economic
development in the developing world would
be reduced by the fragility of the overall
global economy—coupled with protectionism
and fragmentation of trade—along with a
weakening of governance regimes that raise
barriers to cooperation, thereby hindering
agreement on and implementation of largescale, interconnected solutions to pressing
global challenges.
This uncertainty refers to the capacity at
different levels of society to cope with change
and to adapt effectively. This ability to adapt
can mean proactively managing existing
systems and structures to ensure their resilience
against external forces, as well as the ability
to transform those systems and structures
when a changed context means they are no
longer suitable. Adaptive capacity is generally
associated with higher levels of education in
a society, as well as the availability of outlets
for those who have educations to further their
individual and societal well-being. High levels
of adaptive capacity are typically achieved
through the existence of trust in society; the
presence and tolerance of novelty and diversity;
the strength, variety, and overlap of human
institutions; and the free flow of communication
and ideas, especially between and across
different levels, e.g., bottom-up and top-down.
Lower levels of adaptive capacity emerge in
the absence of these characteristics and leave
populations particularly vulnerable to the
disruptive effects of unanticipated shocks.
15Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Once crossed, these axes create a matrix of four
very different futures:
LOCK STEP – A world of tighter top-down
government control and more authoritarian
eadership, with limited innovation and
growing citizen pushback
CLEVER TOGETHER – A world in which
highly coordinated and successful strategies
emerge for addressing both urgent and
entrenched worldwide issues
HACK ATTACK – An economically
unstable and shock-prone world in which
governments weaken, criminals thrive,
and dangerous innovations emerge
SMART SCRAMBLE – An economically
depressed world in which individuals and
communities develop localized, makeshift
solutions to a growing set of problems
16Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
The scenarios that follow are not meant to be
exhaustive—rather, they are designed to be
both plausible and provocative, to engage your
imagination while also raising new questions
for you about what that future might look and
feel like. Each scenario tells a story of how the
world, and in particular the developing world,
might progress over the next 15 to 20 years,
with an emphasis on those elements relating
to the use of different technologies and the
interaction of these technologies with the lives
of the poor and vulnerable. Accompanying
each scenario is a range of elements that aspire
to further illuminate life, technology, and
philanthropy in that world. These include:
• A timeline of possible headlines and
emblematic events unfolding during the
period of the scenario
• Short descriptions of what technologies
and technology trends we might see
• Initial observations on the changing
role of philanthropy in that world,
highlighting opportunities and
challenges that philanthropic
organizations would face and what their
operating environment might be like
• A “day in the life” sketch of a person
living and working in that world
Please keep in mind that the scenarios in
this report are stories, not forecasts, and
the plausibility of a scenario does not hinge
on the occurrence of any particular detail.
In the scenario titled “Clever Together,” for
example, “a consortium of nations, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and companies
establish the Global Technology Assessment
Office”—a detail meant to symbolize how a
high degree of international coordination and
adaptation might lead to the formation of a
body that anticipates technology’s potential
societal implications. That detail, along with
dozens of others in each scenario, is there to
give you a more tangible “feel” for the world
described in the scenario. Please consider
names, dates, and other such specifics in each
scenario as proxies for types of events, not
as necessary conditions for any particular
scenario to unfold.
We now invite you to immerse yourself in
each future world and consider four different
visions for the evolution of technology and
international development to 2030.
17Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
A world of tighter top-down government control and more
authoritarian leadership, with limited innovation and growing
citizen pushback
In 2012, the pandemic that the world had been
anticipating for years finally hit. Unlike 2009’s
H1N1, this new influenza strain—originating
from wild geese—was extremely virulent and
deadly. Even the most pandemic-prepared
nations were quickly overwhelmed when the
virus streaked around the world, infecting nearly
20 percent of the global population and killing
8 million in just seven months, the majority of
them healthy young adults. The pandemic also
had a deadly effect on economies: international
mobility of both people and goods screeched to
a halt, debilitating industries like tourism and
breaking global supply chains. Even locally,
normally bustling shops and office buildings sat
empty for months, devoid of both employees
and customers.
The pandemic blanketed the planet—though
disproportionate numbers died in Africa,
Southeast Asia, and Central America, where
the virus spread like wildfire in the absence
of official containment protocols. But even
in developed countries, containment was a
challenge. The United States’s initial policy of
“strongly discouraging” citizens from flying
proved deadly in its leniency, accelerating the
spread of the virus not just within the U.S. but
across borders. However, a few countries did
fare better—China in particular. The Chinese
government’s quick imposition and enforcement
of mandatory quarantine for all citizens, as well
as its instant and near-hermetic sealing off of
all borders, saved millions of lives, stopping
the spread of the virus far earlier than in other
countries and enabling a swifter postpandemic recovery.
18Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
China’s government was not the only one that
took extreme measures to protect its citizens
from risk and exposure. During the pandemic,
national leaders around the world flexed their
authority and imposed airtight rules and
restrictions, from the mandatory wearing of face
masks to body-temperature checks at the entries
to communal spaces like train stations and
supermarkets. Even after the pandemic faded,
this more authoritarian control and oversight
of citizens and their activities stuck and even
intensified. In order to protect themselves from
the spread of increasingly global problems—from
pandemics and transnational terrorism to
environmental crises and rising poverty—leaders
around the world took a firmer grip on power.
At first, the notion of a more controlled world
gained wide acceptance and approval. Citizens
willingly gave up some of their sovereignty—and
their privacy—to more paternalistic states
in exchange for greater safety and stability.
Citizens were more tolerant, and even eager, for
top-down direction and oversight, and national
leaders had more latitude to impose order in the
ways they saw fit. In developed countries, this
heightened oversight took many forms: biometric
IDs for all citizens, for example, and tighter
regulation of key industries whose stability
was deemed vital to national interests. In many
developed countries, enforced cooperation with a
suite of new regulations and agreements slowly
but steadily restored both order and, importantly,
economic growth.
Across the developing world, however, the
story was different—and much more variable.
Top-down authority took different forms
in different countries, hinging largely on
the capacity, caliber, and intentions of their
leaders. In countries with strong and thoughtful
leaders, citizens’ overall economic status
and quality of life increased. In India, for
example, air quality drastically improved after
2016, when the government outlawed highemitting vehicles. In Ghana, the introduction
of ambitious government programs to improve
basic infrastructure and ensure the availability
of clean water for all her people led to a sharp
decline in water-borne diseases. But more
authoritarian leadership worked less well—and
in some cases tragically—in countries run by
irresponsible elites who used their increased
power to pursue their own interests at the
expense of their citizens.
There were other downsides, as the rise of
virulent nationalism created new hazards:
spectators at the 2018 World Cup, for example,
19Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP
– GK Bhat, TARU Leading Edge, India
wore bulletproof vests that sported a patch
of their national flag. Strong technology
regulations stifled innovation, kept costs high,
and curbed adoption. In the developing world,
access to “approved” technologies increased
but beyond that remained limited: the locus
of technology innovation was largely in the
developed world, leaving many developing
countries on the receiving end of technologies
that others consider “best” for them. Some
governments found this patronizing and refused
to distribute computers and other technologies
that they scoffed at as “second hand.”
Meanwhile, developing countries with more
resources and better capacity began to innovate
internally to fill these gaps on their own.
Meanwhile, in the developed world, the presence
of so many top-down rules and norms greatly
inhibited entrepreneurial activity. Scientists
and innovators were often told by governments
what research lines to pursue and were guided
mostly toward projects that would make money
(e.g., market-driven product development) or
were “sure bets” (e.g., fundamental research),
leaving more risky or innovative research
areas largely untapped. Well-off countries and
monopolistic companies with big research and
development budgets still made significant
advances, but the IP behind their breakthroughs
remained locked behind strict national or
corporate protection. Russia and India imposed
stringent domestic standards for supervising
and certifying encryption-related products and
their suppliers—a category that in reality meant
all IT innovations. The U.S. and EU struck back
with retaliatory national standards, throwing
a wrench in the development and diffusion of
technology globally.
Especially in the developing world, acting in
one’s national self-interest often meant seeking
practical alliances that fit with those
20Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP
interests—whether it was gaining access to
needed resources or banding together in order
to achieve economic growth. In South America
and Africa, regional and sub-regional alliances
became more structured. Kenya doubled its
trade with southern and eastern Africa, as new
partnerships grew within the continent. China’s
investment in Africa expanded as the bargain
of new jobs and infrastructure in exchange for
access to key minerals or food exports proved
agreeable to many governments. Cross-border
ties proliferated in the form of official security
aid. While the deployment of foreign security
teams was welcomed in some of the most dire
failed states, one-size-fits-all solutions yielded
few positive results.
By 2025, people seemed to be growing weary of
so much top-down control and letting leaders
and authorities make choices for them.
Wherever national interests clashed with
individual interests, there was conflict. Sporadic
pushback became increasingly organized and
coordinated, as disaffected youth and people
who had seen their status and opportunities slip
away—largely in developing countries—incited
civil unrest. In 2026, protestors in Nigeria
brought down the government, fed up with the
entrenched cronyism and corruption. Even those
who liked the greater stability and predictability
of this world began to grow uncomfortable and
constrained by so many tight rules and by the
strictness of national boundaries. The feeling
lingered that sooner or later, something would
inevitably upset the neat order that the world’s
governments had worked so hard to establish. •
21Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP
Philanthropic organizations will face hard choices in this world. Given the strong
role of governments, doing philanthropy will require heightened diplomacy skills and
the ability to operate effectively in extremely divergent environments. Philanthropy
grantee and civil society relationships will be strongly moderated by government,
and some foundations might choose to align themselves more closely with national
official development assistance (ODA) strategies and government objectives.
Larger philanthropies will retain an outsized share of influence, and many smaller
philanthropies may find value in merging financial, human, and operational resources.
Philanthropic organizations interested in promoting universal rights and freedoms will
get blocked at many nations’ borders. Developing smart, flexible, and wide-ranging
relationships in this world will be key; some philanthropies may choose to work only
in places where their skills and services don’t meet resistance. Many governments
will place severe restrictions on the program areas and geographies that international
philanthropies can work in, leading to a narrower and stronger geographic focus or
grant-making in their home country only.
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Quarantine Restricts
In-Person Contact;
Cellular Networks
Italy Addresses
‘Immigrant Caregiver’
Gap with Robots
Vietnam to Require
‘A Solar Panel
on Every Home’
African Leaders Fear
Repeat of Nigeria’s 2026
Government Collapse
Trade Hit by Strict
Pathogen Controls
Will Africa’s Embrace
of Authoritarian
Capitalism a la
China Continue?
Proliferating Trade
Networks in Eastern
and Southern Africa
Strengthen Regional Ties
22Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP
While there is no way of accurately predicting what the important technological
advancements will be in the future, the scenario narratives point to areas where
conditions may enable or accelerate the development of certain kinds of technologies.
Thus for each scenario we offer a sense of the context for technological innovation,
taking into consideration the pace, geography, and key creators. We also suggest a few
technology trends and applications that could flourish in each scenario.
Technological innovation in “Lock Step” is largely driven by government and is
focused on issues of national security and health and safety. Most technological
improvements are created by and for developed countries, shaped by governments’
dual desire to control and to monitor their citizens. In states with poor governance,
large-scale projects that fail to progress abound.
Technology trends and applications we might see:
• Scanners using advanced functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
technology become the norm at airports and other public areas to detect
abnormal behavior that may indicate “antisocial intent.”
• In the aftermath of pandemic scares, smarter packaging for food and beverages
is applied first by big companies and producers in a business-to-business
environment, and then adopted for individual products and consumers.
• New diagnostics are developed to detect communicable diseases. The
application of health screening also changes; screening becomes a prerequisite
for release from a hospital or prison, successfully slowing the spread of many
• Tele-presence technologies respond to the demand for less expensive, lowerbandwidth, sophisticated communications systems for populations whose travel
is restricted.
• Driven by protectionism and national security concerns, nations create their
own independent, regionally defined IT networks, mimicking China’s firewalls.
Governments have varying degrees of success in policing internet traffic, but
these efforts nevertheless fracture the “World Wide” Web.
23Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP
Manisha gazed out on the Ganges River, mesmerized by what she saw. Back in
2010, when she was 12 years old, her parents had brought her to this river so that she
could bathe in its holy waters. But standing at the edge, Manisha had been afraid. It
wasn’t the depth of the river or its currents that had scared her, but the water itself:
it was murky and brown and smelled pungently of trash and dead things. Manisha
had balked, but her mother had pushed her forward, shouting that this river flowed
from the lotus feet of Vishnu and she should be honored to enter it. Along with
millions of Hindus, her mother believed the Ganges’s water could cleanse a person’s
soul of all sins and even cure the sick. So Manisha had grudgingly dunked herself
in the river, accidentally swallowing water in the process and receiving a bad case
of giardia, and months of diarrhea, as a result.
Remembering that experience is what made today so remarkable. It was now 2025.
Manisha was 27 years old and a manager for the Indian government’s Ganges
Purification Initiative (GPI). Until recently, the Ganges was still one of the most
polluted rivers in the world, its coliform bacteria levels astronomical due to the
frequent disposal of human and animal corpses and of sewage (back in 2010, 89
million liters per day) directly into the river. Dozens of organized attempts to clean
the Ganges over the years had failed. In 2009, the World Bank even loaned India
$1 billion to support the government’s multi-billion dollar cleanup initiative. But
then the pandemic hit, and that funding dried up. But what didn’t dry up was the
government’s commitment to cleaning the Ganges—now not just an issue of public
health but increasingly one of national pride.
Manisha had joined the GPI in 2020, in part because she was so impressed by
the government’s strong stance on restoring the ecological health of India’s most
treasured resource. Many lives in her home city of Jaipur had been saved by the
government’s quarantines during the pandemic, and that experience, thought
Manisha, had given the government the confidence to be so strict about river usage
24Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives LOCK STEP
now: how else could they get millions of Indian citizens to completely shift their
cultural practices in relationship to a holy site? Discarding ritually burned bodies
in the Ganges was now illegal, punishable by years of jail time. Companies found
to be dumping waste of any kind in the river were immediately shut down by the
government. There were also severe restrictions on where people could bathe and
where they could wash clothing. Every 20 meters along the river was marked by
a sign outlining the repercussions of “disrespecting India’s most treasured natural
resource.” Of course, not everyone liked it; protests flared every so often. But no
one could deny that the Ganges was looking more beautiful and healthier than ever.
Manisha watched as an engineering team began unloading equipment on the banks.
Many top Indian scientists and engineers had been recruited by the government to
develop tools and strategies for cleaning the Ganges in more high-tech ways. Her
favorite were the submersible bots that continuously “swam” the river to detect,
through sensors, the presence of chemical pathogens. New riverside filtration
systems that sucked in dirty river water and spit out far cleaner water were also
impressive—especially because on the outside they were designed to look like
mini-temples. In fact, that’s why Manisha was at the river today, to oversee the
installation of a filtration system located not even 100 feet from where she first
stepped into the Ganges as a girl. The water looked so much cleaner now, and recent
tests suggested that it might even meet drinkability standards by 2035. Manisha
was tempted to kick off her shoe and dip her toe in, but this was a restricted area
now—and she, of all people, would never break that law.
25Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
A world in which highly coordinated and successful
strategies emerge for addressing both urgent and entrenched
worldwide issues
The recession of 2008-10 did not turn into the
decades-long global economic slide that many
had feared. In fact, quite the opposite: strong
global growth returned in force, with the world
headed once again toward the demographic
and economic projections forecasted before the
downturn. India and China were on track to see
their middle classes explode to 1 billion by 2020.
Mega-cities like Sao Paulo and Jakarta expanded
at a blistering pace as millions poured in from
rural areas. Countries raced to industrialize
by whatever means necessary; the global
marketplace bustled.
But two big problems loomed. First, not all
people and places benefited equally from this
return to globalized growth: all boats were
rising, but some were clearly rising more.
Second, those hell-bent on development
and expansion largely ignored the very
real environmental consequences of their
unrestricted growth. Undeniably, the planet’s
climate was becoming increasingly unstable.
Sea levels were rising fast, even as countries
continued to build-out coastal mega-cities. In
2014, the Hudson River overflowed into New
York City during a storm surge, turning the
World Trade Center site into a three-foot-deep
lake. The image of motorboats navigating
through lower Manhattan jarred the world’s
most powerful nations into realizing that climate
change was not just a developing-world problem.
That same year, new measurements showing that
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels were climbing
precipitously created new urgency and pressure
for governments (really, for everyone) to do
something fast. 26Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
In such an interconnected world, where the
behaviors of one country, company, or individual
had potentially high-impact effects on all others,
piecemeal attempts by one nation here, one
small collective of environmental organizations
there, would not be enough to stave off a climate
disaster—or, for that matter, to effectively
address a host of other planetary-scale problems.
But highly coordinated worldwide strategies for
addressing such urgent issues just might. What
was needed was systems thinking—and systems
acting—on a global scale.
International coordination started slowly, then
accelerated faster than anyone had imagined.
In 2015, a critical mass of middle income and
developed countries with strong economic
growth publicly committed to leveraging
their resources against global-scale problems,
beginning with climate change. Together, their
governments hashed out plans for monitoring
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions in
the short term and improving the absorptive
capacity of the natural environment over the
long term. In 2017, an international agreement
was reached on carbon sequestration (by then,
most multinational corporations had a chief
carbon officer) and intellectual and financial
resources were pooled to build out carbon
capture processes that would best support
the global ecosystem. A functioning global
cap and trade system was also established.
Worldwide, the pressure to reduce waste and
increase efficiency in planet-friendly ways was
enormous. New globally coordinated systems
for monitoring energy use capacity—including
smart grids and bottom-up pattern recognition
technologies—were rolled out. These efforts
produced real results: by 2022, new projections
showed a significant slowing in the rise of
atmospheric carbon levels.
Inspired by the success of this experiment in
collective global action, large-scale coordinated
initiatives intensified. Centralized global
oversight and governance structures sprang
up, not just for energy use but also for disease
and technology standards. Such systems
and structures required far greater levels of
transparency, which in turn required more
tech-enabled data collection, processing, and
feedback. Enormous, benign “sousveillance”
systems allowed citizens to access data—all
publically available—in real time and react.
Nation-states lost some of their power and
importance as global architecture strengthened
and regional governance structures emerged.
International oversight entities like the UN
27Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
– Michael Free, Program for Appropriate
Technology in Health (PATH)
took on new levels of authority, as did regional
systems like the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). The worldwide spirit
of collaboration also fostered new alliances and
alignments among corporations, NGOs, and
These strong alliances laid the groundwork for
more global and participatory attempts to solve
big problems and raise the standard of living of
everyone. Coordinated efforts to tackle longentrenched problems like hunger, disease, and
access to basic needs took hold. New inexpensive
technologies like better medical diagnostics and
more effective vaccines improved healthcare
delivery and health outcomes. Companies,
NGOs, and governments—often acting
together—launched pilot programs and learning
labs to figure out how to best meet the needs
of particular communities, increasing the
knowledge base of what worked and what didn’t.
Pharmaceuticals giants released thousands of
drug compounds shown to be effective against
diseases like malaria into the public domain
as part of an “open innovation” agenda; they
also opened their archives of R&D on neglected
diseases deemed not commercially viable,
offering seed funding to scientists who wanted
to carry the research forward.
There was a push for major innovations in
energy and water for the developing world,
as those areas were thought to be the key to
improving equity. Better food distribution was
also high on the agenda, and more open markets
and south-south trade helped make this a reality.
In 2022, a consortium of nations, NGOs, and
companies established the Global Technology
Assessment Office, providing easily accessible,
real-time information about the costs and
benefits of various technology applications to
developing and developed countries alike. All
of these efforts translated into real progress on
real problems, opening up new opportunities
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER
28Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER
to address the needs of the bottom billion—and
enabling developing countries to become engines
of growth in their own right.
In many parts of the developing world, economic
growth rates increased due to a host of factors.
Improved infrastructure accelerated the greater
mobility of both people and goods, and urban
and rural areas got better connected. In Africa,
growth that started on the coasts spread inward
along new transportation corridors. Increased
trade drove the specialization of individual firms
and the overall diversification of economies.
In many places, traditional social barriers to
overcoming poverty grew less relevant as more
people gained access to a spectrum of useful
technologies—from disposable computers to doit-yourself (DIY) windmills.
Given the circumstances that forced these new
heights of global cooperation and responsibility,
it was no surprise that much of the growth
in the developing world was achieved more
cleanly and more “greenly.” In Africa, there
was a big push for solar energy, as the physical
geography and low population density of much
of the continent enabled the proliferation of
solar farms. The Desertec initiative to create
massive thermal electricity plants to supply
both North Africa and, via undersea cable lines,
Southern Europe was a huge success. By 2025,
a majority of electricity in the Maghreb was
coming from solar, with exports of that power
earning valuable foreign currency. The switch
to solar created new “sun” jobs, drastically cut
emissions, and earned governments billions
annually. India exploited its geography to create
similar “solar valleys” while decentralized solarpowered drip irrigation systems became popular
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Reduced energy dependency enabled all of these
countries and regions to better control and
manage their own resources. In Africa, political
architecture above the nation-state level, like
the African Union, strengthened and contributed
to a “good governance” drive. Regional
integration through COMESA (the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and
other institutions allowed member nations to
better organize to meet their collective needs as
consumers and increasingly as producers.
Over the course of two decades, enormous strides
were made to make the world less wasteful, more
efficient, and more inclusive. But the world was
far from perfect. There were still failed states
and places with few resources. Moreover, such
rapid progress had created new problems. Rising
consumption standards unexpectedly ushered
in a new set of pressures: the improved food
distribution system, for example, generated a
food production crisis due to greater demand.
Indeed, demand for everything was growing
exponentially. By 2028, despite ongoing efforts
to guide “smart growth,” it was becoming clear
that the world could not support such rapid
growth forever. •
29Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
In this world, philanthropic organizations focus their attention on the needs of the
bottom billion, collaborating with governments, businesses, and local NGOs to improve
standards of living around the globe. Operationally, this is a “virtual model” world
in which philanthropies use all of the tools at their disposal to reinforce and bolster
their work. With partnerships and networks increasingly key, philanthropies work in a
more virtual way, characterized by lots of wikis, blogs, workspaces, video conferences,
and virtual convenings. Smaller philanthropies proliferate, with a growing number of
major donors emerging from the developing world.
Systems thinking and knowledge management prove to be critical skills, as
philanthropic organizations seek to share and spread best practices, identify leapfrog
opportunities, and better spot problems in failed or weak states. There are considerable
flows of talent between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors, and the lines between
these types of organizations become increasingly blurred.
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Global Economy
Turns the Corner
‘Info Cruncher’ Is
Grads’ Job of
Choice as Data
Era Dawns
A First: U.S. Solar
Power Cheaper than Coal
Consortium of Foundations
Launches Third Green
Revolution as Food
Shortages Loom (2027)
Radical U.S. and China
Emission Targets Signal
New Era in Climate
Change Negotiations
Green Infrastructure
Reshapes Economic
Transparency International
Reports 10th Consecutive Year
of Improved Governance
30Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
In “Clever Together,” strong global cooperation on a range of issues drives technological
breakthroughs that combat disease, climate change, and energy shortages. Trade and
foreign direct investment spread technologies in all directions and make products
cheaper for people in the developing world, thereby widening access to a range of
technologies. The atmosphere of cooperation and transparency allows states and
regions to glean insights from massive datasets to vastly improve the management
and allocation of financial and environmental resources.
Technology trends and applications we might see:
• The cost of capturing data through nanosensors and smart networks falls
precipitously. In many developing countries, this leads to a proliferation of
new and useful services, including “sousveillance” mechanisms that improve
governance and enable more efficient use of government resources.
• Intelligent electricity, water distribution, and transportation systems develop
in urban areas. In these “smart cities,” internet access is seen as a basic right
by the late 2010s.
• A malaria vaccine is developed and deployed broadly—saving millions of lives
in the developing world.
• Advances in low-cost mind-controlled prosthetics aid the 80 percent of global
amputees who live in developing countries.
• Solar power is made vastly more efficient through advances in materials,
including polymers and nanoparticles. An effective combination of
government subsidies and microfinance means solar is used for everything
from desalination for agriculture to wi-fi networks.
• Flexible and rapid mobile payment systems drive dynamic economic growth
in the developing world, while the developed world is hampered by entrenched
banking interests and regulation.
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER
31Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER
Standing next to his desk at the World Meat Science Lab in Zurich, Alec took
another bite of the steak that his lab assistants had just presented to him and chewed
it rather thoughtfully. This wasn’t just any steak. It was research. Alec and his
research team had been working for months to fabricate a new meat product—one
that tasted just like beef yet actually contained only 50 percent meat; the remaining
half was a combination of synthetic meat, fortified grains, and nano-flavoring.
Finding the “right” formula for that combo had kept the lab’s employees working
around the clock in recent weeks. And judging from the look on Alec’s face, their
work wasn’t over. “The flavor is still a few degrees off,” he told them. “And Kofi and
Alana—see what we can do about enhancing this texture.”
As Alec watched his team scramble back to their lab benches, he felt confident that
it wouldn’t be long before they would announce the invention of an exciting new
meat product that would be served at dinner tables everywhere. And, in truth, Alec’s
confidence was very well founded. For one, he had the world’s best and brightest
minds in food science from all over the world working together right here in his
lab. He also had access to seemingly infinite amounts of data and information on
everything from global taste preferences to meat distribution patterns—and just a
few touches on his lab’s research screens (so much easier than the clunky computers
and keyboards of the old days) gave him instant access to every piece of research
ever done in meat science or related fields from the 1800s up through the present
(literally the present—access to posted scientific research was nearly instantaneous,
delayed by a mere 1.3 seconds).
Alec also had strong motivation. There was no doubt that meat science—indeed,
all science—was much more exciting, challenging, and rewarding in 2023 than it
was a few decades ago. The shift from “lone wolf” science to globally coordinated
and open-platform research had greatly accelerated the speed and spread of
breakthrough ideas and developments in all fields. As a result, scientists were
32Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives CLEVER TOGETHER
making real progress in addressing planet-wide problems that had previously
seemed so intractable: people were no longer dying as frequently from preventable
diseases, for example, and alternative fuels were now mainstream.
But other trends were troubling—especially to a scientist who had spent his whole
career researching food. In cities and villages around the world where children
used to be hungry, access to higher-calorie meals had produced alarming increases
in the incidence of obesity and diabetes. The demand for meat, in particular, was
rising, but adding more animals to the planet created its own set of problems, such
as more methane and spiking water demand. And that’s where Alec saw both need
and opportunity: why not make the planet’s meat supply go further by creating a
healthier alternative that contained less real meat?
“Alec, we have a new version for you to try,” yelled Kofi from across the lab. That
was fast, thought Alec, as he searched around his desk for the fork.
33Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
An economically unstable and shock-prone
world in which governments weaken, criminals thrive,
and dangerous innovations emerge
Devastating shocks like September 11, the
Southeast Asian tsunami of 2004, and the
2010 Haiti earthquake had certainly primed
the world for sudden disasters. But no one
was prepared for a world in which large-scale
catastrophes would occur with such breathtaking
frequency. The years 2010 to 2020 were dubbed
the “doom decade” for good reason: the 2012
Olympic bombing, which killed 13,000, was
followed closely by an earthquake in Indonesia
killing 40,000, a tsunami that almost wiped
out Nicaragua, and the onset of the West China
Famine, caused by a once-in-a-millennium
drought linked to climate change.
Not surprisingly, this opening series of deadly
asynchronous catastrophes (there were more) put
enormous pressure on an already overstressed
global economy that had entered the decade
still in recession. Massive humanitarian relief
efforts cost vast sums of money, but the primary
sources—from aid agencies to developed-world
governments—had run out of funds to offer.
Most nation-states could no longer afford their
locked-in costs, let alone respond to increased
citizen demands for more security, more
healthcare coverage, more social programs and
services, and more infrastructure repair. In
2014, when mudslides in Lima buried thousands,
only minimal help trickled in, prompting the
Economist headline: “Is the Planet Finally
These dire circumstances forced tough tradeoffs.
In 2015, the U.S. reallocated a large share of its
defense spending to domestic concerns, pulling
out of Afghanistan—where the resurgent Taliban
seized power once again. In Europe, Asia, South
America, and Africa, more and more nationstates lost control of their public finances, along
34Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
with the capacity to help their citizens and
retain stability and order. Resource scarcities and
trade disputes, together with severe economic
and climate stresses, pushed many alliances
and partnerships to the breaking point; they
also sparked proxy wars and low-level conflict
in resource-rich parts of the developing
world. Nations raised trade barriers in order to
protect their domestic sectors against imports
and—in the face of global food and resource
shortages—to reduce exports of agricultural
produce and other commodities. By 2016, the
global coordination and interconnectedness
that had marked the post-Berlin Wall world was
tenuous at best.
With government power weakened, order rapidly
disintegrating, and safety nets evaporating,
violence and crime grew more rampant.
Countries with ethnic, religious, or class
divisions saw especially sharp spikes in hostility:
Naxalite separatists dramatically expanded
their guerrilla campaign in East India; IsraeliPalestinian bloodshed escalated; and across
Africa, fights over resources erupted along
ethnic or tribal lines. Meanwhile, overtaxed
militaries and police forces could do little to stop
growing communities of criminals and terrorists
from gaining power. Technology-enabled gangs
and networked criminal enterprises exploited
both the weakness of states and the desperation
of individuals. With increasing ease, these
“global guerillas” moved illicit products through
underground channels from poor producer
countries to markets in the developed world.
Using retired 727s and other rogue aircraft, they
crisscrossed the Atlantic, from South America
to Africa, transporting cocaine, weapons, and
operatives. Drug and gun money became a
common recruiting tool for the desperately poor.
Criminal networks also grew highly skilled
at counterfeiting licit goods through reverse
engineering. Many of these “rip-offs” and
copycats were of poor quality or downright
dangerous. In the context of weak health
systems, corruption, and inattention to
standards—either within countries or
from global bodies like the World Health
Organization—tainted vaccines entered the
public health systems of several African
countries. In 2021, 600 children in Cote d’Ivoire
died from a bogus Hepatitis B vaccine, which
paled in comparison to the scandal sparked by
mass deaths from a tainted anti-malarial drug
years later. The deaths and resulting scandals
sharply affected public confidence in vaccine
delivery; parents not just in Africa but elsewhere
35Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
– Aidan Eyakuze, Society for International
Development, Tanzania
began to avoid vaccinating their children, and
it wasn’t long before infant and child mortality
rates rose to levels not seen since the 1970s.
Technology hackers were also hard at work.
Internet scams and pyramid schemes plagued
inboxes. Meanwhile, more sophisticated
hackers attempted to take down corporations,
government systems, and banks via phishing
scams and database information heists, and their
many successes generated billions of dollars in
losses. Desperate to protect themselves and their
intellectual property, the few multinationals
still thriving enacted strong, increasingly
complex defensive measures. Patent applications
skyrocketed and patent thickets proliferated,
as companies fought to claim and control even
the tiniest innovations. Security measures and
screenings tightened.
This “wild west” environment had a profound
impact on innovation. The threat of being
hacked and the presence of so many thefts and
fakes lowered the incentives to create “me first”
rather than “me too” technologies. And so many
patent thickets made the cross-pollination of
ideas and research difficult at best. Blockbuster
pharmaceuticals quickly became artifacts of
the past, replaced by increased production
of generics. Breakthrough innovations still
happened in various industries, but they were
focused more on technologies that could not be
easily replicated or re-engineered. And once
created, they were vigorously guarded by their
inventors—or even by their nations. In 2022, a
biofuel breakthrough in Brazil was protected as a
national treasure and used as a bargaining chip
in trade with other countries.
Verifying the authenticity of anything was
increasingly difficult. The heroic efforts
of several companies and NGOs to create
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK
36Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
recognized seals of safety and approval proved
ineffective when even those seals were hacked.
The positive effects of the mobile and internet
revolutions were tempered by their increasing
fragility as scamming and viruses proliferated,
preventing these networks from achieving the
reliability required to become the backbone
of developing economies—or a source of
trustworthy information for anybody.
Interestingly, not all of the “hacking” was bad.
Genetically modified crops (GMOs) and do-ityourself (DIY) biotech became backyard and
garage activities, producing important advances.
In 2017, a network of renegade African scientists
who had returned to their home countries after
working in Western multinationals unveiled
the first of a range of new GMOs that boosted
agricultural productivity on the continent.
But despite such efforts, the global have/havenot gap grew wider than ever. The very rich still
had the financial means to protect themselves;
gated communities sprung up from New York
to Lagos, providing safe havens surrounded by
slums. In 2025, it was de rigueur to build not
a house but a high-walled fortress, guarded by
armed personnel. The wealthy also capitalized on
the loose regulatory environment to experiment
with advanced medical treatments and other
under-the-radar activities.
Those who couldn’t buy their way out of
chaos—which was most people—retreated
to whatever “safety” they could find. With
opportunity frozen and global mobility at a
near standstill—no place wanted more people,
especially more poor people—it was often a
retreat to the familiar: family ties, religious
beliefs, or even national allegiance. Trust
was afforded to those who guaranteed safety
and survival—whether it was a warlord, an
evangelical preacher, or a mother. In some
places, the collapse of state capacity led to a
resurgence of feudalism. In other areas, people
managed to create more resilient communities
operating as isolated micro versions of formerly
large-scale systems. The weakening of national
governments also enabled grassroots movements
to form and grow, creating rays of hope amid
the bleakness. By 2030, the distinction between
“developed” and “developing” nations no longer
seemed particularly descriptive or relevant. •
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK
37Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Philanthropy is less about affecting change than about promoting stability and
addressing basic survival needs. Philanthropic organizations move to support urgent
humanitarian efforts at the grassroots level, doing “guerrilla philanthropy” by
identifying the “hackers” and innovators who are catalysts of change in local settings.
Yet identifying pro-social entrepreneurs is a challenge, because verification is difficult
amid so much scamming and deception.
The operational model in this world is a “fortress model” in which philanthropic
organizations coalesce into a strong, single unit to combat fraud and lack of trust.
Philanthropies’ biggest assets are their reputation, brand, and legal/financial capacity
to ward off threats and attempts at destabilization. They also pursue a less global
approach, retreating to doing work in their home countries or a few countries that they
know well and perceive as being safe.
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Development Goals
Pushed Back to 2020
Islamic Terror
Networks Thrive in
Latin America
Doctors Without Borders
Confined Within Borders
Warlords Dispense Vital
Medicines to Southeast
Asian Communities
Violence Against
Minorities and Immigrants
Spikes Across Asia
Congo Death Toll Hits
10,000 in Malaria
Drug Scandal (2018)
Nations Struggling with
Resource Constraints Race
to Scale Synthetic Biology
Water War Rages
38Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Mounting obstacles to market access and to knowledge creation and sharing slow the
pace of technological innovation. Creative repurposing of existing technologies—for
good and bad—is widespread, as counterfeiting and IP theft lower incentives for
original innovation. In a world of trade disputes and resource scarcities, much effort
focuses on finding replacements for what is no longer available. Pervasive insecurity
means that tools of aggression and protection—virtual as well as corporeal—are in
high demand, as are technologies that will allow hedonistic escapes from the stresses
of life.
Technology trends and applications we might see:
• Echoing the rise of synthetic chemicals in the nineteenth century, synthetic
biology, often state-funded, is used to “grow” resources and foodstuffs that
have become scarce.
• New threats like weaponized biological pathogens and destructive botnets
dominate public attention, but enduring technologies, like the AK-47, also
remain weapons of choice for global guerrillas.
• The internet is overrun with spam and security threats and becomes
strongly associated with illicit activity—especially on “dark webs” where no
government can monitor, identify, or restrict activities.
• Identity-verification technologies become a staple of daily life, with some
hitches—a database of retina recordings stolen by hackers in 2017 is used to
create numerous false identities still “at large” in the mid-2020s.
• With the cost of cosmetic surgery dropping, procedures like the lunchtime
facelift become routine among emerging middle classes.
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK
39Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK
Trent never thought that his past experience as a government intelligence officer
would convert into something…philanthropic. But in a world full of deceit and
scamming, his skills at discerning fact from fiction and developing quick yet deep
local knowledge were highly prized. For three months now he had been working
for a development organization, hired to find out what was happening in the “grey”
areas in Botswana—a country that was once praised for its good governance but
whose laws and institutions had begun to falter in the last few years, with corruption
on the rise. His instructions were simple: focus not on the dysfunctional (which,
Trent could see, was everywhere) but rather look through the chaos to see what was
actually working. Find local innovations and practices that were smart and good
and might be adopted or implemented elsewhere. “Guerrilla philanthropy” was what
they called it, a turn of phrase that he liked quite a bit.
His trip into Botswana had been eventful—to put it mildly. On-time flights were rare
these days, and the plane got diverted three times because of landing authorization
snafus. At the Gaborone airport, it took Trent six hours to clear customs and
immigration. The airport was bereft of personnel, and those on duty took their
time scrutinizing and re-scrutinizing his visa. Botswana had none of the high-tech
biometric scanning checkpoints—technology that could literally see right through
you—that most developed nations had in abundance in their airports, along their
borders, and in government buildings. Once out of the airport Trent was shocked
by how many guns he saw—not just slung on the shoulders of police, but carried by
regular people. He even saw a mother with a baby in one arm and an AK-47 in the
other. This wasn’t the Botswana he remembered way back when he was stationed
here 20 years ago as an embassy employee.
The organization that hired him was probably more right than it realized in calling
it guerrilla philanthropy. After many weeks spent chasing down leads in Gaborone,
then an unfortunate stint that had him hiking for miles alone through the Kalahari
40Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives HACK ATTACK
Desert, Trent found himself traveling deep into the Chobe Forest (a nice reprieve,
he thought, from inhaling all that sand). One of his informants had told him about
a group of smart youngsters who had set up their own biotechnology lab on the
banks of the Chobe River, which ran along the forest’s northern boundary. He’d
been outfitted with ample funds for grant-making, not the forest bribes he had
heard so much about; regardless of what was taking place in the world around him,
he was under strict orders to behave ethically. Trent was also careful to cover his
tracks to avoid being kidnapped by international crime syndicates—including the
Russian mafia and the Chinese triads—that had become very active and influential
in Botswana. But he’d made it through, finally, to the lab, which he later learned
was under the protection of the local gun lord. As expected, counterfeit vaccines
were being manufactured. But so were GMO seeds. And synthetic proteins. And a
host of other innovations that the people who hired him would love to know about.
41Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
An economically depressed world in which individuals and
communities develop localized, makeshift solutions to a
growing set of problems
The global recession that started in 2008 did not
trail off in 2010 but dragged onward. Vigorous
attempts to jumpstart markets and economies
didn’t work, or at least not fast enough to
reverse the steady downward pull. The combined
private and public debt burden hanging over the
developed world continued to depress economic
activity, both there and in developing countries
with economies dependent on exporting to
(formerly) rich markets. Without the ability to
boost economic activity, many countries saw
their debts deepen and civil unrest and crime
rates climb. The United States, too, lost much of
its presence and credibility on the international
stage due to deepening debt, debilitated markets,
and a distracted government. This, in turn,
led to the fracturing or decoupling of many
international collaborations started by or reliant
on the U.S.’s continued strength.
Also in trouble was China, where social
stability grew more precarious. Depressed
economic activity, combined with the ecological
consequences of China’s rapid growth, started
to take their toll, causing the shaky balance that
had held since 1989 to finally break down. With
their focus trained on managing the serious
political and economic instability at home, the
Chinese sharply curtailed their investments
in Africa and other parts of the developing
world. Indeed, nearly all foreign investment
in Africa—as well as formal, institutional
flows of aid and other support for the poorest
countries—was cut back except in the gravest
42 humanitarian emergencies. Overall, economic Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
stability felt so shaky that the occurrence of a
sudden climate shock or other disaster would
likely send the world into a tailspin. Luckily,
those big shocks didn’t occur, though there was a
lingering concern that they could in the future.
Not that anyone had time to think about the
future—present challenges were too pressing.
In the developed world, unemployment rates
skyrocketed. So did xenophobia, as companies
and industries gave the few available jobs to
native-born citizens, shunning foreign-born
applicants. Great numbers of immigrants who
had resettled in the developed world suddenly
found that the economic opportunities that had
drawn them were now paltry at best. By 2018,
London had been drained of immigrants, as they
headed back to their home countries, taking
their education and skills with them. Reverse
migration left holes in the communities of
departure—both socially and literally—as stores
formerly owned by immigrants stood empty.
And their homelands needed them. Across the
developing world and especially in Africa,
economic survival was now firmly in local
hands. With little help or aid coming through
“official” and organized channels—and in the
absence of strong trade and foreign currency
earnings—most people and communities had no
choice but to help themselves and, increasingly,
one another. Yet “survival” and “success”
varied greatly by location—not just by country,
but by city and by community. Communities
inside failed states suffered the most, their
poor growing still poorer. In many places, the
failures of political leadership and the stresses of
economic weakness and social conflict stifled the
ability of people to rise above their
dire circumstances.
Not surprisingly, across much of the developing
world the rural-urban divide gaped wider,
as more limited availability and access to
resources like IT and trade made survival
and self-sufficiency much more challenging
for non-urban dwellers. Communications and
interactions that formerly served to bridge one
family or one village or one student with their
counterparts in other places—from emailing
to phone calls to web postings—became less
reliable. Internet access had not progressed
far beyond its 2010 status, in part because
the investment dollars needed to build out the
necessary infrastructure simply weren’t there.
When cellphone towers or fiber optic cables
broke down, repairs were often delayed by
months or even years. As a result, only people
in certain geographies had access to the latest
43Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
– Jose Gomez-Marquez, Program Director
for the Innovations in International Health
initiative (IIH), MIT
communication and internet gadgets, while
others became more isolated for lack of
such connections.
But there were silver linings. Government
capacity improved in more advanced parts of the
developing world where economies had already
begun to generate a self-sustaining dynamic
before the 2008-2010 crisis, such as Indonesia,
Rwanda, Turkey, and Vietnam. Areas with good
access to natural resources, diverse skill sets,
and a stronger set of overlapping institutions
did far better than others; so did cities and
communities where large numbers of “returnees”
helped drive change and improvement. Most
innovation in these better-off places involved
modifying existing devices and technologies to
be more adaptive to a specific context. But people
also found or invented new ways—technological
and non-technological—to improve their
capacity to survive and, in some cases, to
raise their overall living standards. In Accra, a
returning Ghanaian MIT professor, working with
resettled pharma researchers, helped invent a
cheap edible vaccine against tuberculosis that
dramatically reduced childhood mortality across
the continent. In Nairobi, returnees launched a
local “vocational education for all” project that
proved wildly successful and was soon replicated
in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Makeshift, “good enough” technology
solutions—addressing everything from water
purification and harnessing energy to improved
crop yield and disease control—emerged to fill
the gaps. Communities grew tighter. Micromanufacturing, communal gardens, and
patchwork energy grids were created at the local
level for local purposes. Many communities took
on the aura of co-ops, some even launching
Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE
44Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
currencies designed to boost local trade and
bring communities closer together. Nowhere was
this more true than in India, where localized
experiments proliferated, and succeeded or
failed, with little connection to or impact on
other parts of the country—or the world.
These developments were encouraging, but also
frustrating. In the absence of enduring trade and
FDI channels, local experiments and innovations
could neither scale nor boost overall growth. For
those looking, it was difficult to find or access
creative solutions. Scaling was further inhibited
by the lack of compatible technology standards,
making innovations difficult to replicate. Apps
developed in rural China simply didn’t work in
urban India.
High-speed internet access—which gradually
emerged in some areas despite weak government
or philanthropic support—did help, enabling
students in isolated pockets in the developing
world to access knowledge and instruction
through the written word and other media like
video. But the development of tangible devices,
products, and innovations continued to lag in
places where local manufacturing skills and
capacities had not yet scaled. More complex
engineering solutions proved even more difficult
to develop and diffuse.
By 2025, collaboration was finally improving,
with ecosystems of research and sharing—many
of them “virtual”—beginning to emerge. Yet
without major progress in global economic
integration and collaboration, many worried that
good ideas would stay isolated, and survival and
success would remain a local—not a global or
national—phenomenon. •
Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE
45Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Philanthropic organizations look to fund at the grassroots level, in order to reach people
more quickly and solve short-term problems. The meta-goal in this world is to scale up:
to identify and build capacity from the individual through the institutional, because
without global coordination, innovation cannot scale on its own. Philanthropy requires
a keen screening capacity to identify highly localized solutions, with specialized
pockets of expertise that make partnerships more challenging and transitions between
sectors and issues harder to achieve.
Philanthropy operations are decentralized; headquarters are less important, and
the ability to quickly access different parts of the world and reconfigure teams on
short notice is key. Office space is rented by the day or week, not the month or year,
because more people are in the field—testing, evaluating, and reporting on myriad
pilot projects.
Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
National Medical Labs in
Southeast Asia Herald
New Diagnostics for
Native Diseases
‘Returnee’ Innovators
Struggle to Expand Sales
Beyond Home Markets
VC Spending
Within Sub-Saharan
Africa Triples
Low-Cost Water
Purification Device Halves
Diarrhea Deaths in India
Chinese Government
Pressured as Protests
Spread to 250 Cities
Famine Haunts
Maker Faire Ghana Partners
with ‘Idol’ Franchise to
Spotlight Young Innovators
46Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE
Economic and political instability fracture societies in the developed world, resources
for technology development diminish, and talented immigrants are forced to return
to their countries of origin. As a result, capacity and knowledge are distributed more
widely, allowing many small pockets of do-it-yourself innovation to emerge. Low-tech,
“good enough” solutions abound, cobbled together with whatever materials and designs
can be found. However, the transfer of cutting-edge technology through foreign direct
investment is rare. Structural deficiencies in the broader innovation ecosystem — in
accessing capital, markets, and a stable internet—and in the proliferation of local
standards limit wider growth and development.
Technology trends and applications we might see:
• Energy technology improvements are geared more toward efficiency—getting
more from existing sources of power—than new-generation technologies,
though some local improvements in generating and distributing wind and
geothermal energy do occur.
• Breakdowns in the global medicine supply chain accelerate the emergence of
locally bioengineered super-strength homeopathic remedies, which replace
antibiotics in the dispensaries of many developing-world hospitals.
• Widespread micro-manufacturing, using 3D printers, enables the fabrication
of replacement components for engines and machines, allowing “perpetual
maintenance” to compensate for broken trade links.
• Garden allotments proliferate in mega-cities as new urban-dwellers seek to
supplement a scarce food supply and maintain their agricultural heritage.
• Technically advanced communities use mesh networks to ensure high-speed
internet access, but most rural poor remain cut off from access.
47Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Scenario Narratives SMART SCRAMBLE
The beat-up six-seater plane in which Lidi was the lone passenger lurched suddenly.
She groaned, grabbed the armrests, and held on as the plane dipped sharply before
finally settling into a smooth flight path. Lidi hated small planes. But with very
few commercial jets crisscrossing Africa these days, she didn’t have much choice.
Lidi—an Eritrean by birth—was a social entrepreneur on a mission that she deemed
critical to the future of her home continent, and enduring these plane flights was
an unfortunate but necessary sacrifice. Working together with a small team of
technologists, Lidi’s goal was to help the good ideas and innovations that were
emerging across Africa to spread faster—or, really, spread at all.
In this, Lidi had her work cut out for her. Accelerating and scaling the impact
of local solutions developed for very local markets was far from easy—especially
given the patchiness of internet access across Africa and the myopic perspective
that was now, in 2025, a widespread phenomenon. She used to worry about how to
scale good ideas from continent to continent; these days she’d consider it a great
success to extend them 20 miles. And the creative redundancy was shocking! Just
last week, in Mali, Lidi had spent time with a farmer whose co-op was developing a
drought-resistant cassava. They were extremely proud of their efforts, and for good
reason. Lidi didn’t have the heart to tell them that, while their work was indeed
brilliant, it had already been done. Several times, in several different places.
During her many flights, Lidi had spent hours looking out the window, gazing
down on the villages and cities below. She wished there were an easier way to let
the innovators in those places know that they might not be inventing, but rather
independently reinventing, tools, goods, processes, and practices that were already
in use. What Africa lacked wasn’t great ideas and talent: both were abundant. The
missing piece was finding a way to connect those dots. And that’s why she was back
on this rickety plane again and heading to Tunisia. She and her team were now
concentrating on promoting mesh networks across Africa, so that places lacking
internet access could share nodes, get connected, and maybe even share and scale
their best innovations.
48Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
As you have seen, each of the scenarios, if it were to
unfold, would call for different strategies and have different
implications for how a range of organizations will work and
relate to changes in technology. But no matter what world
might emerge, there are real choices to be made about what
areas and goals to address and how to drive success toward
particular objectives.
We hope that reading the scenario narratives and
their accompanying stories about philanthropy,
technology, and people has sparked your
imagination, provoking new thinking about
these emergent themes and their possibilities.
Three key insights stood out to us as we
developed these scenarios.
First, the link between technology and
governance is critical to consider in better
understanding how technology could be
developed and deployed. In some futures, the
primacy of the nation-state as a unit of analysis
in development was questioned as both supra- or
sub-national structures proved more salient to
the achievement of development goals. In other
futures, the nation-state’s power strengthened
and it became an even more powerful actor
both to the benefit and to the detriment of
the development process, depending on the
quality of governance. Technologies will affect
governance, and governance in turn will play
a major role in determining what technologies
are developed and who those technologies are
intended, and able, to benefit.
A second recurring theme in the scenarios is that
development work will require different levels of
intervention, possibly simultaneously. In some
scenarios, philanthropic organizations and other
actors in development face a set of obstacles in
working with large institutions, but may face a
yet-unfolding set of opportunities to work with
nontraditional partners—even individuals. The
organization that is able to navigate between
these levels and actors may be best positioned to
drive success.
49Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
– Isha Ray, Professor, University of
California-Berkeley School of Information,
Energy, and Resources Group
Concluding Thoughts
The third theme highlights the potential value
of scenarios as one critical element of strategy
development. These narratives have served to
kick-start the idea generation process, build the
future-oriented mindset of participants, and
provide a guide for ongoing trend monitoring
and horizon scanning activities. They also offer
a useful framework that can help in tracking and
making sense of early indicators and milestones
that might signal the way in which the world is
actually transforming.
While these four scenarios vary significantly
from one another, one theme is common to them
all: new innovations and uses of technology
will be an active and integral part of the
international development story going forward.
The changing nature of technologies could
shape the characteristics of development and the
kinds of development aid that are in demand. In
a future in which technologies are effectively
adopted and adapted by poor people on a broad
scale, expectations about the provision of
services could fundamentally shift. Developing
a deeper understanding of the ways in which
technology can impact development will better
prepare everyone for the future, and help all of
us drive it in new and positive directions.
50Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
The following is a list of the 15 critical uncertainties presented to participants during this project’s
primary scenario creation workshop. These uncertainties were themselves selected from a significantly
longer list generated during earlier phases of research and extensive interviewing. The uncertainties fall
into three categories: technological, social and environmental, and economic and political.
Each uncertainty is presented along with two polar endpoints, both representing a very different direction
in which that uncertainty might develop.
new technologies  technologies with the most
impact on development  existing technologies
both developed and
developing worlds 
origin of technology
innovations critical to
 developed world and some
slow the adoption
of novel technologies  social and cultural norms  allow for rapid adoption
of novel technologies
few 
new innovations that
substantially reduce child and
infant mortality (vaccines,
treatments, cures)
 many
static, traditional  community identity in the
developing world  dynamic, open to the
novel and nontraditional
restricted  educational and employment
opportunities for women  expanding
infrequent and manageable 
occurrence of “shocks”
like disease, famine, and
natural disasters
 frequent and highly
poor and worsening 
quality of the local
environment in the developing
world (air, water, sanitation,
built environment, etc.)
 improved and improving
de-prioritized  global climate change
awareness and action  prioritized
51Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
worse than expected  global economic performance,
2010-2015  improves significantly
inhibiting  rules and norms around
entrepreneurial activity  supportive
static 
education and training
opportunities in the
developing world
 increasing
marginal and contained  conflict in the developing world  pervasive and widespread
weak, with barriers to
cooperation  international economic and
strategic relationships  strong, with more
supranational cooperation
worse and more prone to
disruptions  food security in
the developing world  better and more secure
This report is the result of extensive effort and
collaboration among Rockefeller Foundation
initiative staff, Foundation grantees, and external
experts. The Rockefeller Foundation and GBN
would like to extend special thanks to all of the
individuals who contributed their thoughtfulness
and expertise throughout the scenario process.
Their enthusiastic participation in interviews,
workshops, and the ongoing iteration of the
scenarios made this co-creative process more
stimulating and engaging that it could ever have
been otherwise.
Project Leads
Claudia Juech, Managing Director
Evan Michelson, Senior Research Associate
Core Team
Karl Brown, Associate Director
Robert Buckley, Managing Director
Lily Dorment, Research Associate
Brinda Ganguly, Associate Director
Veronica Olazabal, Research Associate
Gary Toenniessen, Managing Director
Thank you as well to all Foundation staff who
participated in the scenario creation workshop
in December.
A special thank you also to Laura Yousef.
52Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
G.K. Bhat, TARU Leading Edge, India
Le Bach Duong, Institute for Social Development
Studies, Vietnam
Aidan Eyakuze, Society for International
Development, Tanzania
Michael Free, PATH, Seattle, WA
Namrita Kapur, Root Capital, Boston, MA
Paul Kukubo, Kenya ICT Board, Kenya
Joseph Mureithi, Kenyan Agriculture Research
Institute, Kenya
Stewart Brand, Cofounder of GBN and President of the
Long Now Foundation
Robert de Jongh, Managing Regional Director,
SNV Latin America
José Gomez-Marquez, Program Director for the
Innovations in International Health initiative (IIH),
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Natalie Jeremijenko, Experimental Designer and
Director of xdesign Environmental Health Clinic,
New York University
Athar Osama, Visiting Fellow, Frederick S. Pardee
Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future,
Boston University
Isha Ray, Professor, School of Information (Energy and
Resources Group), University of California-Berkeley
Enrique Rueda-Sabater, Director of Strategy and
Business Development for Emerging Markets, Cisco
Caroline Wagner, Senior Analyst, SRI International
and Research Scientist, Center for International
Science and Technology Policy, The George
Washington University
Andrew Blau, Co-President
Tara Capsuto, Senior Practice Associate
Lynn Carruthers, Visual Practitioner
Michael Costigan, Practitioner
Jenny Johnston, Senior Editor
Barbara Kibbe, Vice President of
Client Services, Monitor Institute
Brie Linkenhoker, Senior Practitioner
Peter Schwartz, Chairman
53Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
The Rockefeller Foundation
420 Fifth Ave
New York, NY 10018
tel +1 212 869 8500 fax +1 212 764 3468
Global Business Network
101 Market Street
Suite 1000
San Francisco, CA 94105
tel +1 415 932 5400 fax +1 415 932 5401

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